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35 
THE COMPLICITY AND LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT RAPE 
John D. Haskell* 
Abstract: The inauguration of the International Criminal Court and the 
proliferation of criminal tribunals over the last twenty years are often pre-
sented as historic and progressive moments in the trajectory of interna-
tional law’s response to victims of rape in armed conflicts. However, these 
moments may signal not only inclusion, but also repression. They signal 
not just progress, but also a renewed rhetorical and institutional legitimi-
zation of colonialism. Historicizing the advent of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court, this Article ex-
amines some ways that international law obfuscates its complicity in 
armed conflict rape, looking particularly at calls within the profession for 
greater efficiency, nation-state security, and reparations for victims. In do-
ing so, this Article grapples with questions concerning the limits and al-
ternatives to our current legal imagination towards rape in armed con-
flict. 
“We think that justice is very important, but at the moment, it is meaning-
less.” 
—M.K., Rwandan rape survivor1 
Introduction: Progress or Paternalism? 
 The standard account of the history of international law in the 
context of widespread rape in armed conflicts envisions that interna-
tional law operates as a flexible process to: 1) restore peace and secu-
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1 Human Rights Watch, Struggling to Survive: Barriers to Justice for Rape 
Victims in Rwanda 36 (2004) [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch, Struggling to Survive], 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/09/29/struggling-survive. 
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rity to armed conflict situations;2 and 2) define the terms and meth-
ods by which women may be integrated into the international legal 
framework. In other words, modern international law is characterized 
principally in its struggle, or project, to bring order to chaos and in-
clusion to those on the peripheries. 
 This Article posits that each legal restructuring to bring order 
and inclusion is accompanied by a simultaneous act that instills new 
imbalances and forms of exclusion.3 The standard approach denies 
these excluded experiences or “realities” (what Nathaniel Berman 
characterizes as “a series of catastrophes and mutations”) to maintain 
that international law is somehow linked to civilization, to freedom 
and democracy, and to modernity.4 Against civilization, barbarian-
ism—the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia, the 100-day 
“genocide” in Rwanda,5 the ongoing armed conflicts and butchery in 
                                                                                                                      
2 See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). The Resolution reads in 
part: “[c]ommending the important work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
contributing to lasting peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 
progress made since their inception . . . .” Id. It continues to discuss recent changes to be 
implemented in trying the accused; however, there is no language attempting to define 
the ultimate objective, or “important work” of the international tribunals aside from “con-
tributing to lasting peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.” See id. Here, 
it may be relevant in the overall scheme of the analysis to pause for a moment and con-
sider the implications of this choice in words. In short, the structure and language of Reso-
lution 1503 boldly suggests that mass rape in armed conflicts is prosecuted not in the in-
terests of justice for the victims so much as it is in the interests of ensuring the stability and 
welfare of the mentioned states (“lasting peace and security”). See id. This will be discussed 
more in Part II. 
3 For a thorough treatment of this idea in other contexts see Antony Anghie, Finding 
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 1, 7, 21 (1999) (stating, for example, that “positivists were engaged in an ongo-
ing struggle to define, subordinate, and exclude the uncivilized native” while asserting 
itself as a set of techniques, or “doctrines that could coherently account for native person-
ality”; and also, that “[l]egal science in the latter half of the nineteenth century was con-
ceived of . . . as a struggle against chaos”); see also Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of Em-
pire, Presentation at the American Society of International Law’s 93rd Annual Meeting 
(March 1999), in 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1515, 1521, 1523, 1531, 1553 (1999) (analogizing 
Caribbean history to international legal history in order to characterize the history of in-
ternational law as “phase[s] of repression,” observing that “decolonization was only the 
end of a specific form of imperial domination, one that only took definitive shape in the 
late 19th century,” and stating that “each gesture of greater inclusion in the ‘international 
legal community’ has been accompanied by a gesture of exclusion”). 
4 See Berman, supra note 3, at 1523. 
5 See Robert Murtfeld, Lemkin’s Genocide, Presentation at the International Law Asso-
ciation (British Branch) Spring Conference, “Tower of Babel—International Law in the 
21st Century: Coherent or Compartmentalised?” (Mar. 3, 2006) (on file with author) 
 
2009] Armed Conflict Rape & International Law 37 
the Sudan. Against freedom and democracy, empire—often projected 
onto the former Soviet Union or the western international order be-
fore de-colonization. Against modernity, the past—a term of dark am-
bivalence and vague foreboding, the signaling of a return to nature, 
to the primitive, to empire—in short, to a time when the world was 
ruled and defined by strength not morals, by the sword rather than 
the pen, by fear instead of enlightenment. International law con-
stantly speaks in the language of the past and the future; the way for-
ward is always to elevate international law above politics and local am-
bitions. International law is, in essence, presented as a dynamic 
emancipation project whereby international law has been reborn and 
the role of law, and implicitly western civilization, redeemed from the 
horrors of its past. 
 Yet there is also anxiousness, or ambivalence, within the disci-
pline and the international community at large as to international 
law’s purpose and practicality.6 The proclamation that the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) symbolizes a “historical development” 
rings shrill, perhaps too insistent on its place and character, especially 
when only a handful of cases have been successfully prosecuted by 
either the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).7 
                                                                                                                      
(challenging the concept of “genocide” as it functions on a moral and pragmatic level 
within the international human rights scheme and with international lawyers). 
6 See id. (describing calls for “coherency” and “compartmentalization” of international 
law as “anxious”). In fact, the tendencies are not so much alternatives, but moments in a 
process whereby international lawyers rationalize the horrors of their discipline with their 
own sense of right and wrong, and of purpose. Specifically, international lawyers com-
partmentalize, or distance, the horrors from their profession to present international law 
with a coherent history and purpose—that being, a story of the few bringing order and 
civilization to the many. To some extent, the narrative carries with it a missionary zeal, a 
duty to bring light to darkness, to right the wrong. Indeed, the current mindset of interna-
tional legal enthusiasts and skeptics is still conditioned by the Old Testament and Judeo-
Christian doctrinal traditions. See John Haskell, From the Sacred to the Secular . . . And 
Back Again?: The Dynamic of Self-Determination from Genesis to Modern International 
Law, Presentation at the International Law Association (British Branch) Spring Confer-
ence, “The Tower of Babel—International Law in the 21st Century—Coherent or Com-
partmentalised?” (Mar. 3, 2006) (on file with author) (tracing how the notion of differ-
ence developed in the creation account of Genesis and throughout the Old Testament (a 
“doctrine of difference”)—from light and darkness to the lineage of Adam and Satan to 
Israel and enemy nations to Gentiles becoming spiritual Israel and non-Christians—affects 
how we currently understand genocide, civilization, and the way forward). 
7 See Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal Ad-
judication, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 440, 447–48 (quoting former ICTY Prosecutor Justice 
Louise Arbour’s explanation that the ICC courts are forced to be selective in their prose-
cutions because of limited resources); Press Release, Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, 
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Ultimately, the ICC looks as if it will operate as a more symbolic, 
rather than practical, institutional functionary. These voices loudly 
clamor that they represent something new, or are at least at odds with 
the past, when at the same moment the structural continuity in power 
and rhetoric today is strikingly reminiscent of the past. 
 For example, jurists in the nineteenth century were preoccupied 
with the problem of how to justify colonial expansion. The answer 
came in what Antony Anghie calls “the dynamic of difference,” 
whereby jurists, “using the conceptual tools of positivism, postulated a 
gap, understood principally in terms of cultural differences, between 
the civilized European and uncivilized non-European world.”8 Once 
this gap was established, international law “proceeded to devise a se-
ries of techniques for bridging this gap—of civilizing the uncivilized.”9 
Implicit in this arrangement was the notion that civilization was a 
known commodity, a set of pre-determined and neutral characteristics 
that international jurists could use to gauge and determine other 
communities’ and peoples’ levels of and capacity for civilization, and 
hence the degree to which such groups might partake in the benefits, 
protections, and obligations afforded through formally recognized 
legal identity within the emerging global western order. Through 
“powerful evocations of the backward and barbaric,” international law 
was able to confirm “the incongruity of any correspondence between 
Europe and these societies,” thereby justifying the continued exclu-
sion of non-European peoples from international law.10 In other 
words, international law became the process by which uncivilized, 
non-European peoples were re-imagined, assimilated, and commonly 
subordinated into a Eurocentric web of ambiguous power relations 
among European states and other colonial territories.11 
 In the same way, the modern international law project concerning 
rape in armed conflict also establishes a similar tension between the 
                                                                                                                      
International Criminal Court is Here! Rome Statute Enters into Force ( July 1, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/news/prjuly1.htm (ex-
pressing excitement over the “historic” nature of the development of the ICC courts). 
8 Anghie, supra note 3, at 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 29. 
11 Id. at 25, 29 (noting how positivists saw law both as “the creation of unique, civilized, 
and social institutions” and the means by which states “could be[come] members of ‘in-
ternational society’”); see also David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: 
History of an Illusion, 17 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 99, 119 (1997) (observing that “international 
lawyers” in the nineteenth century “would increasingly think of a single, universal, interna-
tional legal fabric ordering relations among civilized and uncivilized states”). 
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civilized and the uncivilized, albeit in slightly modified language. Pur-
suant to the rights that are guaranteed to women in international hu-
man rights instruments, the rape victim (the “uncivilized,” or other) is 
given a legal identity invoking all the duties and protections of the in-
ternational legal framework (the “civilized”). Thus, international law is 
presented as the means by which women acquire their identity—as new 
members within civilization, and hence entitled to human dignity, self-
determination, and justice. In this sense, the current conception of in-
ternational law is rooted in, or at least mimics, a past where interna-
tional law explicitly served the colonial ambitions of European nation-
states. And, just as colonized peoples often found themselves no better 
off after their encounters with nineteenth century colonial powers, the 
needs and restitution of raped women in armed conflicts have not been 
a reality despite the attention of international law. 
 In this Article, I look at how the conceptual identities and practi-
cal realities of raped women are subordinated, and sometimes ex-
cluded completely, in the common dialogue among international 
scholars concerning rape in armed conflict and the modern reform 
framework implemented by the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. I argue that 
these moments of exclusion call into question the very legitimacy and 
standard depiction of international legal history evolving through 
struggle and recollection from a patriarchal, colonial past to a more 
pluralistic, humanitarian liberal-modernist regime.12 
 This Article also addresses the periodic permutations of the legal 
order, but not as developments or setbacks that may be measured and 
plotted in some grand, comprehensive timeline. Instead, these changes 
should be understood as incoherent responses by the post-World War II 
legal order to the widespread rape of women in armed conflicts that 
has occurred and continues to occur with frequency and severity. In-
ternational law’s efforts to provide a structure to dispense justice and 
restitution for raped women in armed conflicts are recognized to gen-
erate simultaneously new forms of “alienation and subordination” that 
                                                                                                                      
12 In critiquing the way the standard account approaches the history of international 
law in regards to rape in armed conflict, however, I do not want merely to establish an-
other narrative to counter the dominant approach. To do so would only adopt the same 
myth, or idea, that the “shapeless mass of undigested and sometimes inconsistent rules” 
within international law can be sculpted into some coherent and chronological narrative 
of inclusion and progress. See Anghie, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting Thomas Lawrence, 
The Principles of International Law 94 (1895)). Also, it would ignore that inherent in 
any attempt to produce a narrative, the actual stories and experiences of the survivors and 
their families in these situations are subordinated to the purposes and structural needs of 
the narrative structure. 
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deny any sense of “empowerment” to either the rape victims, or women 
in general.13 In other words, rather than being acts augmenting the 
inclusion and representation of rape victims (and, as often asserted, all 
women) within the “contemporary vocabulary of human rights, gov-
ernance, and economic liberation,” international law commonly and 
tragically operates to efface the identities, histories, and claims of rape 
victims.14 
I. Defining Rape in Armed Conflicts 
A. The Concept of the “Unprecedented” 
 The efforts to define rape in the Rome Statute15 and the case his-
tory within the International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) are often asserted as proof that 
women are finding unprecedented inclusion into the international 
legal order. According to the standard narrative, this period of “un-
precedented” inclusion was inaugurated with the international com-
munity’s shock over the severe and distinct character of the mass 
rapes that occurred in the wars of succession in Yugoslavia (1992–94) 
and the 100-day genocide in Rwanda (1994).16 
 Just as nineteenth century jurists employed a “series of [legal] 
techniques” to the “postulation of a gap” between civilized (Euro-
pean) countries and uncivilized (non-European) countries, modern 
legal practitioners and scholars present the armed conflicts in Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda as “unprecedented” to postulate a gap between 
armed conflict situations and international law before and after the 
early 1990s and to juxtapose the rights of raped women in armed con-
                                                                                                                      
13 See id. at 70. 
14 See id. at 80; Berman, supra note 3, at 1547 (describing this as a process whereby in-
clusion means “internalization, displacement, and transformation” for subjects on the 
peripheries of the international community). 
15 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (giving the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression); Frances 
Pilch, The Crime of Rape in International Humanitarian Law, 9 USAFA J. Legal Stud. 99, 
109–11 (1999). The statute includes as crimes against humanity: “rape, sexual slavery, en-
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence.” Rome Statute, supra, art. 7(1)(g). 
16 Pilch, supra note 15, at 106–07 (noting that the mass rape in Yugoslavia and the ge-
nocide in Rwanda facilitated the establishment of tribunals to try rape crimes). 
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flicts situations before the “intervention” of international law with the 
rights of raped women under the international legal order.17 
 Presenting the early 1990s as “unprecedented,” jurists establish the 
notion that international legal history may be divided into two periods: 
the first period rooted in patriarchal sentiments and extending to the 
last decade of the twentieth century; the second period, a modern and 
increasingly pluralistic, gender-sensitive institution. For example: 
The [United Nations Secretary General] Kofi Annan as-
serted at the close of the Rome Conference that only a few 
years ago nobody would have thought the Rome outcome 
possible. It is only now, at the turn of the millennium, and 
after numerous large scale atrocities, that the momentum 
has swung forcefully behind the need to reign in impunity 
for gross atrocity and for the international community to 
take seriously the need for structures to enforce the law all 
too often violated.18 
This historical approach is echoed throughout legal scholarship in 
strikingly uniform language. Again, in line with the standard narra-
tive, another writer states: 
Undoubtedly, the single greatest impetus in the development 
of international humanitarian law concerning rape and sex-
ual violence came as a result of the events in the former Yugo-
slavia and the formation and record of the ICTY. These events 
marked a turning point in the international understanding of rape in 
armed conflict and a quantum leap in the criminalization of rape 
and sexual violence.19 
 Pursuant to the dominant narrative, the unique, or unprece-
dented, nature of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide 
in Rwanda are made the catalyst by which international law and “wom-
ankind” become more attuned to one another. In doing so, an explicit 
gap is established between international law before and after the early 
1990s, whereby: 1) the past is largely irrelevant (except as a means of 
charting international legal history as a story of growing inclusion and 
sensitivity to women by the international community); and 2) any cur-
rent defects are not due to any fundamental attribute of international 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Anghie, supra note 3, at 5, 25, 29. 
18 Timothy L. H. McCormack & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute 
for the New International Criminal Court, 23 Melb. U. L. Rev. 635, 638–39 (1999). 
19 Pilch, supra note 15, at 101–02 (emphasis added). 
42 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:35 
law, but only the lingering shadows of a receding patriarchal, imperial-
ist past. In short, by labeling these two events “unprecedented,” inter-
national law provided itself with a story, characters, and an alibi: the 
story is about international law as a universalist, humanitarian enter-
prise; the characters are women in general and pluralists pitted against 
international law’s patriarchal past, the interests of nation-states in pre-
serving the full benefits of their sovereignty, and “uncivilized” mo-
ments, such as armed conflicts; and the alibi is that international legal 
history, as a “drama of social evolution,” is not a perfect science, but 
rather a struggle towards greater rights and sensitivities, wherein its 
failures are necessarily learning moments for not only international 
law, but also the entire international community (representative of 
humanity).20 
 To support the notion that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda are “unprecedented,” or at least exceptional, as far as 
armed conflicts go, international legal commentators generally rely on 
the brutality and multiplicity of rapes that have occurred in both re-
gions. These rapes are claimed to be especially egregious since they 
were not only attacks against women, but also used “as an instrument of 
. . . ‘ethnic cleansing’” and as a method of “torture, reward and a boost 
to soldiers’ morale . . . ‘to ensure that the victims and their families 
would never want to return to [the] area.’”21 In other words, as Todd 
Salzman explains, “the Bosnian conflict brought the practice of rape 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 101 (explaining that mainstream international lawyers 
view their progress as slow and gradual, but “part of a drama of social evolution”). 
21 Pilch, supra note 15, at 102 (quoting Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: 
Challenges Facing the International Triubnal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 Hum. Rts. Q. 649, 658 
& n.54 (1995)). What is particularly interesting about this statement is the idea that these 
rapes are elevated to a “new level.” See Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic 
Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 
Hum. Rts. Q. 348, 349 (1998). Hence, it is “exceptional,” or “unprecedented,” because 
they “involve a public component” and represent “deliberate attacks on specific popula-
tions” in that they “bring shame upon the nation, the people, or the family.” See Kristen 
Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 
32 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 625, 631–32 (2001). This idea is repeated in other works as 
well. See, e.g., Pilch, supra note 15, at 102–03 (“[W]hat is happening here is first a genocide, 
in which ethnicity is a tool for political hegemony: the war is an instrument of the geno-
cide; the rapes are an instrument of the war.” (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Rape, Geno-
cide, and Women’s Human Rights, in Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 187 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994))). Pursuant to this approach, it is not 
the act of rape itself, but its threat to the “nation” and “people” that entitles heightened 
awareness by the international community. In practical and theoretical terms, this attitude 
subordinates the hardships and suffering of rape victims and their right to peace and jus-
tice by requiring an additional level of intent to qualify for the full benefits of inclusion in 
the international legal order. 
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with genocidal intent to a new level,” which he notes “[c]aused an out-
cry among the international community . . . [because] these violations 
were not random acts . . . [but] an assault against the female gender, 
violating her body and its reproductive capabilities as a ‘weapon of 
war.’”22 
 Some writers have gone further and drawn a connection between 
German and Japanese atrocities in World War II and the atrocities of 
Serbian forces in the Yugoslavian wars and Hutu militias in Rwanda. For 
example, speaking of the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, Kelly Askin 
states that “a number of reports . . . exposed a calculated system of . . . 
rape . . . and other atrocities unseen in Europe since the Nazi holocaust 
of World War II.”23 Likewise, Catharine MacKinnon describes the 
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, stating that “[t]his war is to 
everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday anti-Semitism.”24 
 These attempts to link the Holocaust with the events in Yugosla-
via and Rwanda are problematic on two counts. First, the project of 
equating these events seems prone to inaccuracy and generalization. 
Can we really reduce the complexity and diversity of victims’ experi-
ences in World War II with the equally diverse and complex experi-
ences of women in Yugoslavia and Rwanda? Why would we want to 
make this analogy anyway? What purpose does it serve? Is there truly a 
universally shared experience? And if there is not, then upon what 
basis can we justify humanitarian intervention and the promotion of 
liberal international legal norms? Second, we may ask how the geno-
cidal events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda can be “historic” and “un-
precedented” moments, yet also find their identity rooted, to some 
degree, in the Nazi program in World War II. In other words, how can 
these events be both “unprecedented” and “analogous”? 
 This persistence in analogizing the atrocities in World War II with 
the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda is predicated on the 
needs of the standard international legal narrative. The end of World 
War II is often associated with the birth of the U.N. and the phenom-
ena of individual human rights and the augmentation of international 
                                                                                                                      
22 Salzman, supra note 21, at 349. Again, his choice to characterize rape as “an assault 
against the female gender” offers an interesting glimpse at how the activity by the interna-
tional legal order in relation to women raped in the crisis in Yugoslavia is projected, or 
universalized, into a grander story of all womankind making strides forward. See id. 
23 Kelly D. Askin, A Decade in Human Rights Law: A Decade of the Development of Gender 
Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003, 11 Hum. Rts. Brief 16, 16 (2004). 
24 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA Women’s L.J. 59, 65 
(1993). 
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actors and institutions. By attaching Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the 
events in World War II, the standard account suggests that these re-
cent armed conflicts are also a monumental break from the past. It 
endorses international legal history as “memorabilia” of moments 
that intimates a larger story of how international law brings the bene-
fits of civilization (expressed in terms such as human rights, self-
determination, and modernization) to groups and individuals held 
out as previously beyond the peripheries of the international com-
munity.25 In other words, the analogy allows international law to see 
itself as undergoing a process of “renewal,” whereby it is able to shed 
its past—excusing its wrongs by addressing each instance only in what 
may be learned and how it can be remedied. 
 By breaking from the past, the story shifts from inspecting how 
the international community and its normative valuations may have 
contributed to these various moments of crisis to focusing on how in-
ternational law can formulate a solution. Consequently, here, we see 
another “gap” is being created in the way the narrative link between 
World War II and the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda dis-
tances the international community from being implicated in these 
situations and preserves the characterization of international law as a 
pluralistic, humanitarian project. In silencing the past, the interna-
tional order washed its hands of any guilt. 
B. The International Community’s Complicity in the Former Yugoslavia  
and Rwanda: A Brief History 
1. The Former Yugoslavia 
 The armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the responses 
by the international legal order in the 1990s, however, were both 
shaped, in part, by their entanglements much earlier in the twentieth 
century. In Yugoslavia, for example, the roots of the conflict extended 
back at least to the Allied power’s creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
                                                                                                                      
25 This notion of “memorabilia” comes from a lecture by Professor Catriona Drew in 
the course, Colonialism, Empire and International Law, at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London. What we observe is that this conception of interna-
tional law as an evolving process or standardization of liberal humanitarian values and 
principles of legal (and, theoretically political) egalitarianism is dependent on interna-
tional jurists being able to chart a progressive, linear journey by international lawyers and 
western powers. This historical map-making dominates the psychology of international 
legal scholarship concerning rape in armed conflicts. 
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Croats, and Slovenes as a sovereign state in the wake of World War I.26 
The territory was prone to internal ethnic conflict, “[p]opulated as it 
was by sundry antagonistic communities of widely divergent cultures, 
who worshipped in several different religions, had inherited eight legal 
systems from their former sovereignties, and wrote the basic Serbocroa-
tian language in two orthonographies.”27 In 1929, the state’s name was 
changed to Yugoslavia.28 The new state experienced “intense nationalist 
strife among its various ethnic groups in the 1920s and 1930s.”29 Then, 
in 1941, the Nazis invaded, which in turn led to the creation of Croatia 
and Serbia, which served largely as puppet states.30 Later, that same 
decade, the Germans were expelled and Soviet troops installed Josip 
Broz Tito as the new leader of the country, which consisted of six pri-
mary republics and two autonomous regions.31 
 During Tito’s regime, ethnic tensions were largely mediated; how-
ever, the breakdown of the former Soviet Union sparked ethno-
nationalistic fervor in the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as among ethnic Serbs (under the 
leadership of Slobodan Milosevic) who were encouraged and financed 
by the state of Serbia to fight against the other republics for a united 
Yugoslavia under the Serbian flag.32 The ethnic turmoil was further ex-
asperated by the fact that the 1992 Arbitration Committee, in its opin-
ions in the Conference on Yugoslavia, relied heavily on defining the 
states along Soviet-sponsored territorial borders and referred problems 
of ethnic conflict to the prescription of minority rights protection, 
reminiscent of the interwar regime under the League of Nations.33 
                                                                                                                      
26 See James R. McHenry III, Note, The Prosecution of Rape Under International Law: Justice 
That Is Long Overdue, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1269, 1280 (2002) (arguing that the con-
flict might even be traced back further to “relations among ethnic groups, first within the 
larger Ottoman Empire and then later as a mix of sovereign states, such as Serbia and 
Montenegro”). 
27 Id. at 1280–81 (quoting Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the 
Two World Wars 202 (1974)). 
28 Id. at 1281. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 McHenry, supra note 26, at 1281. 
32 Id. at 1281–82. 
33 See generally Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Arbi-
tration Committee) Opinion Nos. 2–3, reprinted in Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter 
Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
178, 183–85 (1992) (concluding that “the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups” and that 
the boundaries between Croatia and Serbia “may not be altered except by agreement 
freely arrived at”). 
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 Moreover, in spite of brewing ethnic hostilities, the European 
community initiated measures to attempt and preserve a “united” 
Yugoslavia. In 1991, the European Union Council of Ministers set up a 
conference explicitly with the aim of keeping Yugoslavia united.34 The 
conference was followed shortly afterwards by “economic deterrence in 
the concurrent aims of keeping the republics from claiming independ-
ence and preventing the Serbian government from using military force 
to enforce unity,” as well as periodic threats from the European Com-
munity that it would deny EC membership to any newly declared inde-
pendent states emerging from the Yugoslavian conflict.35 Despite these 
measures and threats, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia 
achieved recognition as independent republics in 1992.36 
 In response to the political recognition of these republics by the 
international community, the Serbian and Croatian governments in-
curred intense assaults within Bosnia-Herzegovina, framing their inva-
sions as “an attempt to protect [their] minority populations in the vari-
ous republics and to retain [their] hold over portions of the land.”37 
The invasion carried out by the Serbian forces was particularly brutal 
and severe. Hence, while Croatian and Serbian soldiers attacked the 
local Bosnian Muslim population, it is generally accepted among the 
international legal order that the Serbian crimes were “more wide-
spread and involved larger numbers of people.”38 
 In the name of “ethnic homogeneity,” according to the U.N. Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Human Rights, between 1992 and 1994, as many as 
20,000 women were raped in the ensuing conflict.39 Many of these 
                                                                                                                      
34 Karina Michael Waller, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise of 
Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts Has Rendered International Human Rights Laws Ineffective, Especially 
Regarding Sex-Based Crimes, 9 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 621, 637 (2001). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 637–38; see also McHenry, supra note 26, at 1282 (reporting that Croatia in-
vaded Bosnia-Herzegovina on the grounds that twenty percent of the Bosnian population 
was ethnically Croatian). 
38 See McHenry, supra note 26, at 1282. Thus, when the international community 
stepped in, it primarily focused its resources on women raped by Serbian forces—the ex-
periences of women raped by Croatian forces, to some degree, received a subordinate 
status compared to the other victims. See id. 
39 See Jocelyn Campanaro, Note, Women, War, and International Law: The Historical Treat-
ment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 Geo. L.J. 2557, 2570 (2001) (citing Preliminary Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-Like Prac-
tices During Periods of Armed Conflict, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Provisional 
Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/26 (1996)). Other statistics have placed 
the number of women raped at approximately 50,000. See Shana Swiss & Joan E. Giller, 
Rape as a Crime of War—A Medical Perspective, 270 JAMA 612, 613 (1993), available at http:// 
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women were subjected to “gang rapes, multiple rapes, vaginal and anal 
rapes, fellatio and public rapes,”40 often “as part of a deliberate system 
of ethnic cleansing [of Bosnian Muslims]” in which women became the 
principal “vehicles utilized to humiliate, subordinate, or emotionally 
destroy entire communities; to cause chaos and terror; to make people 
flee; and to ensure the destruction or removal of an unwanted group by 
forcible impregnation by a member of a different ethnic group [pri-
marily Serbian].”41 
 Government officials (“from police officers to high ranking offi-
cials”)42 and, in some cases, U.N. peacekeepers were reported to have 
participated in the rapes.43 “Rape camps” were established to cater to 
the soldier populations.44 According to one correspondent within the 
conflict, there were “reports of UN troops participating in raping Mus-
                                                                                                                      
www.womens-rights.org/publications/jama93.html (noting that estimates of women raped 
in Bosnia “fluctuated widely from 10,000 to 60,000”); Marius van Niekerk, Report to the 
World Veterans Federation’s Committee on African Affairs, Breaking the Silence—Why Do 
Soldiers Rape in War? (1999), http://www.saveterans.org.za/breakingthesilence.htm (stating 
that the armed crisis in Yugoslavia resulted in 50,000 victims who were raped in front of 
their family members). 
40 Kelly D. Askin, Developments in International Criminal Law: Sexual Violence in Decisions 
and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 97, 
119 (1999) (discussing specifically certain crimes charged in the Foca case, but also as-
serted more generally). 
41 Campanaro, supra note 39, at 2569–70; see, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 67. 
MacKinnon notes that the Serbian soldiers impregnate the Bosnian women on the belief: 
1) that the rape will shame the women and child as “dirty and contaminated” by their 
families and culture; and 2) that it will cause the children born from Bosnian women to 
“rise up and join their fathers” because the “sperm carries all the genetic material [from 
the Serbian father].” See MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 67. MacKinnon holds this second 
notion as the “ultimate racialization of culture, the (one hopes) final conclusion to Na-
zism: now culture is genetic.” Id. Here, again, we see the narrative connection being drawn 
between the World War II era and the armed crisis in the former Yugoslavia (and, as this 
Article posits, the standard approach’s set-up for representing international law as part of a 
universal project). See id. 
42 E.g., Dean Adams, Comment, The Prohibition of Widespread Rape as a Jus Cogens, 6 San 
Diego Int’l L.J. 357, 382 (2005). 
43 E.g., MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 67. Sometimes the women know their assailants. 
See, e.g., 2 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina 21, 182 (1993) (quot-
ing one woman who testified that “she recognized two of the soldiers who came into the 
room . . . looking for women . . . [and] testified that the two men had been her highschool 
[sic] teachers”). 
44 Maria B. Olujic, Women, Rape, and War: The Continued Trauma of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons in Croatia, 13 Anthropology E. Eur. Rev. 40, 40 (1995), available at http://con-
dor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer13_1/Olujic.html (noting that these makeshift broth-
els were generally given names that either signified the establishment as a place for “weary 
travelers in the Balkans” (such as “Vilina Vlas,” meaning “Nymph’s Hairdressers,” and 
“Kafana Sonja,” meaning “Coffeehouse Sonja”) or “suggest[ed] the modern, Western life-
style” (such as “Laser” and “Fast Food Restaurant”)). 
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lim and Croatian women from the Serb rape/death camps. Their pres-
ence has apparently increased trafficking in women and girls through 
the opening of brothels, brothel-massage parlors, peep-shows, and the 
local production of pornographic films.”45 There was also “[a] former 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commander report-
edly accept[ing] offers from Serbian commanders to bring him Muslim 
girls from the camps for orgies.”46 In many of these camps, the “major-
ity of female victims have died, either from gunshots, bleeding as a con-
sequence of gang rape, or by suicide motivated by shame.”47 
 These atrocities finally prompted the U.N. to act in 1992 through 
a series of Security Council Resolutions condemning the armed con-
flict.48 In October 1992, Resolution 780 expressed the international 
community’s “grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread viola-
tions of international humanitarian law . . . reports of mass killings 
and the continuance of the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing.’”49 Resolu-
tion 780 also authorized a Commission of Experts to investigate and 
submit reports on the alleged human rights violations.50 The outcome 
of these reports led the Security Council to conclude that the Serbian 
forces practiced a policy of ethnic cleansing; furthermore, rape and 
sexual assaults were included as part of this policy’s implementation.51 
Resolution 770 allowed governments to take “all measures necessary” 
to bring an end to the human rights abuses.52 
 The Security Council Resolutions, however, were not meaning-
fully enforced, and consequently were “seemingly inconsequential to 
the warring parties” and “[i]n some instances, the Resolutions only 
                                                                                                                      
45 MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 67 (citing Letter from [name withheld] to Author 
(Oct. 13, 1992)). 
46 Id. MacKinnon also briefly mentions an interview with Ragib Hadzic, head of the 
Center for Research on Genocide and War Crimes, to state that “General MacKenzie vis-
ited the ‘Sonje’ restaurant in Dobrinia, which was a brothel and had become a wartime 
rape/death camp. He reportedly loaded four Muslim women in his UNPROFOR truck, 
and drove away. The women have never been seen again.” Id. at 67–68 n.24. 
47 Olujic, supra note 44, at 40. 
48 Waller, supra note 34, at 647. 
49 S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992) (requesting the “Secretary-
General to establish . . . an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse . . . its 
conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention”). 
50 Id.; see Waller, supra note 34, at 647–48. 
51 Waller, supra note 34, at 648. 
52 S.C. Res. 770, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (Aug. 13, 1992) (calling “States to take . . . all 
measures necessary to facilitate . . . the delivery . . . of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo 
and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina”); see also Waller, supra 
note 34, at 649–50 (noting that Resolution 770 does not reach the level of authorizing 
states to use force to dispel human rights abuses). 
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served to increase the hostilities that caused the massacre of thou-
sands of Bosnian Muslims.”53 In Security Council meetings, China and 
Russia proved reluctant to endorse any military force against the 
Serbs “for fear that such action would create a dangerous precedent 
for them.”54 The United States was also opposed to intruding into the 
Yugoslavian armed conflict. One clear reason for this hesitation in 
responding to the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia is that the 
United States has always been remiss to ratify any international hu-
man rights instruments for fear it might “jeopardize” its sovereignty 
and Constitution.55 Another possible reason may be that the turmoil 
surrounding the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the conflict 
in Somalia had put a damper on the United States’s desire to involve 
itself in any precarious military operation.56 Expressing the United 
States’s seeming exhaustion abroad, President William J. Clinton told 
the U.N. in his 1999 address, that “some are troubled that the United 
States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe 
in the world. We cannot do everything, everywhere.”57 Thus, in 1993, 
pursuant to Resolution 827, the Security Council decided against mili-
tary intervention and in favor of establishing the ICTY.58 
2. Rwanda 
 The notion that the establishment of the ICTY was a step forward 
in ensuring humanitarian protection for all women was challenged 
within a year of its inception; in 1994, Rwanda broke out in civil war. 
In a period of approximately one hundred days, Hutu forces wiped 
out somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 Tutsi in a full scale ex-
termination campaign.59 
 While the genocidal campaign officially began when Rwandan 
President Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down on April 6, 1994 and 
extremist Hutu claimed that Tutsi were responsible, the origins of the 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Waller, supra note 34, at 650. 
54 Id. at 652. 
55 See id. at 656–57. 
56 See id. at 656. 
57 See id. 
58 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (declaring the establishment 
of an “international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via”). 
59 Askin, supra note 23, at 16 (stating that “between April 7th and mid-July 1994, some 
700,000 men, women, and children were systematically slaughtered”); see also Hum. Rts. 
Watch, Struggling to Survive, supra note 1, at 7 (estimating that at least 500,000 died). 
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conflict stretch much further back.60 Hutu and Tutsi are the two prin-
cipal ethnic groups in Rwanda.61 Prior to the late nineteenth century, 
the Tutsi exercised minority rule over the Hutu population through a 
caste system.62 The distinctions between the two groups, however, 
were not rigid or categorically ethnic—wealthy Hutu could undergo a 
ceremony to become Tutsi.63 Similarly, Tutsi could become Hutu if 
they fell into poverty.64 Thus, to some extent, the classifications were 
chiefly related to wealth and status, not ethnicity; moreover, ethnic 
divisions were blurred by the fact that both groups spoke the same 
language and practiced the same religion.65 
 In the early years of the twentieth century, Belgium colonizers 
encouraged “a historical myth of differences between Hutu and Tutsi 
in order to control the majority Hutu and institutionalize minority 
rule.”66 This myth proposed that “Tutsi were a Nilo-Hamitic race from 
Egypt and Ethiopia who naturally ruled over the Bantu Hutu.”67 The 
notion of racial difference was also promoted through the colonial 
practice of measuring each person’s nose to determine their group 
identity.68 Furthermore, the Belgium colonizers issued identity cards 
that marked the local population as Hutu or Tutsi—Tutsis enjoying 
privileges generally denied to Hutu peoples, such as the right to go to 
school or enter the civil service.69 
 Minority rule, however, is difficult to maintain. In 1959, Hutu dis-
content escalated into open revolt against the Tutsi aristocracy.70 The 
establishment of a Hutu-led government in 1961 did little to lessen 
                                                                                                                      
60 Alexandra A. Miller, Comment, From the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to 
the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include Rape, 108 Penn 
St. L. Rev. 349, 350 (2004). Even though no one claimed responsibility and there was no 
convincing proof of guilt, the Rwandan radio blamed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, primar-
ily consisting of Tutsi refugees, for the shooting. See id. at 350 n.3. Other allegations have 
also been made that members of Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard shot down the air-
plane. Id. 
61 Id. at 351. 
62 Id. at 352. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Miller, supra note 60, at 351–52. 
66 Id. at 352. This may be inaccurate, to some degree, as to whether Belgian colonizers 
really “institutionalized” these differences, or if they were already firmly in place, albeit 
lacking any violent element (that is, the fact that there was an official ceremony by which 
Hutu could become Tutsi may be seen as an “institutionalized” difference). See id. 
67 Id. at 352. 
68 Id. at 352 n.24. 
69 Id. 
70 Miller, supra note 60, at 352. 
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pressure on the Tutsi population.71 By 1964, approximately 10,000 
Tutsi had been killed, while hundreds of thousands more were forced 
to flee the country.72 Things worsened in the 1970s when Major Gen-
eral Habyarimana, a Hutu senior army commander, led a successful 
coup against the government: the Mouvement Revolutionnaire Na-
tional pour le Developpement (MRND).73 The new government, led 
by President Habyarimana and a small inner circle, the Akazu, initi-
ated a policy of “Hutu Power,” which essentially stood for “the Hutu 
need to rid Rwanda of Tutsi entirely.”74 By late 1990, the MRND had 
reduced the Tutsi population in Rwanda to nine percent.75 
 In 1991, due to increasing international and political pressure, as 
well as the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (a group of Tutsi 
refugees demanding repatriation) in Northern Rwanda, the MRND was 
reduced to a minority party and a new, less militant Hutu government 
was established.76 Habyarimana and his followers, however, secretly or-
ganized a plan to retake control, primarily premised once again on the 
concept of “cleansing” of Tutsi from Rwanda to mobilize support.77 
 The international community was aware of Habyarimana’s plans. 
Indeed, there was ample evidence of an imminent genocide. For ex-
ample, between October 1990 and February 1994, “Hutu Power” loyal-
ists massacred thousands of Tutsi.78 Also, in 1990, Kangura (Wake Up!), 
a newspaper sympathetic with Habyarimana, published the “Hutu Ten 
Commandments,” which became “the Hutu manifesto” with calls to 
“stop having mercy on the Tutsi.”79 In response to the escalating anti-
Tutsi sentiment, however, the international community was largely si-
lent. 
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73 Id. at 352–53. 
74 Id. at 353 & n.31. 
75 Miller, supra note 60, at 353. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 353–54. 
78 See id. at 353 n.31. Even as a new government came into power, the MRND did not 
stop its “Hutu power” mission. Indeed, Habyarimana and his forces began to focus even 
more intently on carrying out a program of genocide against the Tutsi, possibly believing it 
was their best opportunity to regain power. Id. at 353–54. Thus, in the early 1990s, “Hutu 
power” loyalists established a youth militia, the Interahamwe, to “facilitate the cleansing of 
Tutsi from Rwanda,” distributed weapons to Hutu civilians, supported the preparation of 
extermination lists, and assassinated certain political figures. Id. at 354 (citing Prosecutor v. 
Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR 97-21-I, Indictment ( Jan. 3, 2001)). 
79 Id. at 353 n.34. 
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 When Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down on April 6, 1994, 
Hutu leaders incited the militia and public to “hunt down and quash” 
the Tutsi.80 The international community again did not intervene. In-
stead, the U.N. ignored the pleading of UNAMIR commander, General 
Romeo Dallaire, to supply more forces and actually reduced its pres-
ence in Rwanda from 2500 to 270 peacekeepers during the first three 
weeks of the genocide.81 Pursuant to U.N. orders, these troops aban-
doned outposts, which had been protecting fleeing Tutsi. In one case, 
“almost one hundred Belgian peacekeepers abandoned approximately 
two thousand unarmed Rwandan citizens in one of these outposts. As 
the soldiers left through one gate, the killers entered through another. 
More than one thousand unarmed civilians died in that slaughter.”82 
Over the next one hundred days, according to an estimate by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Rwanda, “at least 250,000 women were raped.”83 
These women were subjected to “individual rape; gang-rape; rape with 
sticks, guns, or other objects,” often by “relatives, neighbors, teachers, 
employers, domestic servants, police, and soldiers in the Rwandan De-
fense Forces.”84 Rwandan officials “sanctioned and encouraged this vio-
lence,” even dispensing propaganda, often in the form of pornography, 
which presented Tutsi women as “sexual temptresses.”85 
 The severity of the rapes “wrought devastating medical and psy-
cho-social consequences on Rwandan women.”86 For example, Hu-
man Rights Watch reports that: 
women and girls contracted sexually transmitted diseases, 
including HIV/AIDS; faced unwanted pregnancies and 
health complications resulting from botched abortions; and 
suffered sexual mutilation and other injuries, such as fistu-
las, uterine problems, vaginal lesions, and scarring. Ten years 
                                                                                                                      
80 See, e.g., Askin, supra note 23, at 16. 
81 Miller, supra note 60, at 351. 
82 See id. at 351 n.12. 
83 Hum. Rts. Watch, Struggling to Survive, supra note 1, at 7. Other reports put 
the number of women raped as high as 500,000. See Stephanie Wood, A Woman Scorned for 
the “Least Condemned” War Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War 
Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 Colum. J. Gender & L. 274, 285 
(2004). 
84 Hum. Rts. Watch, Struggling to Survive, supra note 1, at 7, 12. 
85 See Wood, supra note 83, at 284–85. Tutsi women were also portrayed as spies who 
would “dominate and undermine Hutu men.” Id. at 284–85 n.55. 
86 Hum. Rts. Watch, Struggling to Survive, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that these 
rapes were carried out “on the basis of . . . [the women’s] ethnicity . . . as an effective 
method to shame and conquer the Tutsi population”). 
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after the events, victims of sexual violence [in Rwanda] . . . 
are still haunted by the abuse and remain traumatized, stig-
matized, and isolated.87 
 According to one source, seventy percent of these rape survivors 
are HIV positive,88 which may under-represent the number of victims 
due to the social stigma attached to women who have been raped.89 
One widowed woman, a rape survivor in Rwanda, explains that “[o]ur 
past is so sad. We are not understood by society . . . We become crazy. 
We aggravate people with our problems. We are the living dead.”90 
Another woman, also a woman raped and widowed during the geno-
cide, accounts that “[w]hen they kill your husband and children and 
then leave you, it is like killing you. They left us to die slowly. I wish 
every day that I was dead.”91 
 The international order, however, remained reluctant to character-
ize these rapes, as well as other atrocities, in such a way to warrant in-
tervention even though “all understood the gravity of the crisis within 
the first twenty-four hours.”92 More than two weeks after the beginning 
of the genocide, the Secretary General of the U.N. acknowledged the 
conflict, but “portrayed the attackers as independent actors rather than 
a group following a government-directed program.”93 Likewise, a day 
before the Secretary General’s remarks, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Rwanda, David Rawson, “characterized the slaughter as tribal killings 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. The report also notes that Rwanda’s National Population Office estimated that 
2000 to 5000 children were born out of rapes during the armed conflict. Id. 
88 See Wood, supra note 83, at 286. 
89 See Binaifer Nowrojee, Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Vio-
lence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath 1, 72–75 (1996); Michelle J. 
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield 
Law, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 51, 66–69 (2002) (discussing how women with sexual histories, 
including rape victims, are perceived as unchaste and without legal redress for sexual as-
sault). 
90 Nowrojee, supra note 89, at 73. 
91 Id. at 74–75; see Adams, supra  note 42, at 381 (observing that “[t]hose not murdered 
immediately following the heinous acts were permitted to live so they would ‘die from 
sadness’”). 
92 Miller, supra note 60, at 362 (quoting Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the 
Story: Genocide in Rwanda 595). Miller also points out that during the first few weeks of 
April 1994, a number of international organizations understood the gravity of the situa-
tion. Id. Thus, for example, Oxfam called the atrocities, “genocidal slaughter”; the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross declared it “had rarely seen a human tragedy on the 
scale of the massacres.” Id. 
93 Id. at 362–63. 
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rather than genocide.”94 Finally, on November 8, 1994, the U.N. acted; 
pursuant to Resolution 955, the Security Council created the ICTR.95 
C. The Rome Statute: A Step Forward? 
 Rape continues with impunity in armed conflicts around the 
world, as well as within the former Yugoslavia and the countries sur-
rounding Rwanda. In Kosovo, for example, reports estimate that be-
tween 750 to 1000 women continue to be trapped in brothels.96 Like-
wise, in 2000, the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1212, which 
suggests that rape is still used in Kosovo as a “systematic war crime” and 
constitutes a crime against humanity.97 These allegations are even more 
disturbing in light of reports by female trafficking victims that they were 
sometimes forced to provide free sexual services for local police offi-
cers, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
officials from the International Police Task Force (IPTF).98 
 Widespread rape is also present in armed conflicts in Sierra 
Leone, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), all countries that have recognized a number of human rights 
instruments and conventions.99 Rebel fighters in Sierra Leone, for ex-
ample, have been reported to brand women, making it difficult for 
their victims to be accepted back into the community.100 In the DRC, 
Amnesty International reports that since 2002, approximately forty 
rapes occur every day in the Uvira area.101 Hundreds of allegations have 
also surfaced since 2001 alleging widespread rape in Sri Lanka by offi-
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95 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (declaring the establishment 
of an “international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda”). 
96 Tina R. Karkera, Comment, The International Criminal Court’s Protection of Women: The 
Hands of Justice at Work, 12 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 197, 218–19 (2003). 
97 See Eur. Parl. Ass., 2000 Sess., Res. No. 1212 (April 3, 2000) (calling on member 
states to ratify the Treaty on the Statute of the International Criminal Court). 
98 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002: Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via 385 (2002) [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] (not-
ing that trafficking continued to “surge into 2001”); Human Rights Watch, World Re-
port 2002: Women’s Human Rights 541–43 (2002) [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch, 
Women’s Human Rights]; Karkera, supra note 96, at 219. 
99 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 42, at 374–80. 
100 Jennifer Friedlin, Experts Make Treatment of Wartime Rape a Priority, Women’s E News, 
Jan. 16, 2005, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2146/context/cover. 
101 Media Briefing, Amnesty International, Making Violence Against Women Count: 
Facts and Figures—A Summary (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
library/asset/AC777/034/2004/en/dom-ACT770342004en.pdf. 
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cers within the Sri Lankan Army, Navy, and police force.102 Rape is also 
used as a “widespread and sometimes systematic . . . weapon of war” in 
Sudan.103 Likewise, the U.S. Department of States reports that in Iraq: 
The Iraqi Government uses rape and sexual assault of 
women to achieve the following goals: to extract information 
and forced confessions from detained family members; to in-
timidate Iraqi oppositionists by sending videotapes showing 
the rape of female family members; and to blackmail Iraqi 
men into future cooperation with the regime. Some Iraqi au-
thorities even carry personnel cards identifying their official 
“activity” as the “violation of women’s honor.”104 
 Indeed, the ICC was established in large part as a response to the 
failures of the ITCY and ICTR. Like the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC and 
its founding document, the Rome Statute, are generally heralded as a 
“historic development” and a “coming of age . . . [bringing] a funda-
mental change for women.”105 The Rome Statute, like the ICTR and 
ICTY Statutes, does not specifically define rape; however, the elements 
of rape are included in the Elements of Crimes, which acts as an in-
terpretive guide for ICC judges.106 The two basic elements are: 
 1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by con-
duct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of 
the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual or-
gan, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any 
object or any other part of the body; [and] 
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104 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State Office of Int’l Women’s Issues, Iraqi Women Under 
Saddam’s Regime: A Population Silenced (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.state. 
gov/g/wi/rls/18877.htm; see also Valerie Oosterveld, When Women Are the Spoils of War, 
Unesco Courier, available at http://www.unesco.org/courier/1998_08/uk/ethique/txt1. 
htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (estimating that Iraqi soldiers raped at least 5000 Kuwaiti 
women during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). All of these countries, however, have adopted 
a number of international human rights instruments that prohibit rape. See Adams, supra 
note 42, at 374–80. That widespread rape continues in these regions with impunity may 
call into question the legitimacy of the current formalistic fetish with legal language and 
provisions rather than addressing political and social realities. 
105 See, e.g., Press Release, Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, supra note 7. 
106 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 7(1)(g), 9(1) (declaring that the Elements of 
Crimes “assist[s] the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, 8,” which 
includes the interpretation of “rape” in article 7(1)(g)); see also Boon, supra note 21, at 
644. 
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 2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of 
force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, du-
ress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, 
against such persons or another person, or by taking advan-
tage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was commit-
ted against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.107 
 This definition, like the recent ICTY decision in Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundzija, recognizes consent as an affirmative defense rather than an 
element of rape.108 According to Rule 70 of the ICC’s Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence: “[c]onsent cannot be inferred by reason of any 
words or conduct of a victim . . . or taking advantage of a coercive en-
vironment undermin[ing] the victim’s ability to give voluntary and 
genuine consent.”109 The language is also significantly gender-neutral, 
as evidenced in the Elements of Crimes that “the concept of ‘invasion’ 
is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral.”110 At the same 
moment, however, rape is still understood to require “penetration.”111 
 Article 7(g) of the Rome Statute specifically enumerates rape as a 
crime against humanity and article 8(b)(xxii) deems it a violation of the 
laws and customs of war.112 Furthermore, the Statute notes that rape in 
armed conflict is also a grave breach and violation of article 3 common 
to the four Geneva Conventions.113 The language of the Statute also im-
plies that rape will be considered a crime against humanity and a war 
crime whether the armed conflict is “international” or “internal.”114 
                                                                                                                      
107 See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, Sept. 10, 2002, 
ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). 
108 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 271 (Dec. 10, 1998) (stating that the defense of consent was not raised to counter the 
elements of rape). 
109 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 70, Sept. 10, 
2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A). 
110 See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, supra note 107, art. 7(1)(g)-1 
n.15. 
111 See id. art. 7(1)(g)-1 (defining rape as when the “perpetrator invaded the body of a 
person by conduct resulting in penetration”). 
112 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 7(g), 8(b)(xxii) (listing rape as a “crime 
against humanity” and a “war crime”). 
113 See id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). In light of case judgments in the ICTY and 
ICTR, rape most likely will also be inferred in the Statute’s prohibitions against genocide 
in article 6. See id. art. 6(b). 
114 See id. arts. 7(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(c). Judge McDonald, President of the ICTY, also has 
argued that “the dichotomy that characterizes international humanitarian law—whether the 
conflict is international or internal—is untenable at the end of the twentieth century.” See 
Gabrielle K. McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature of the 
Laws of War, 156 Mil. L. Rev. 30, 34–35 (1998). 
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 Thus, pursuant to the Rome Statute, rape may be a crime against 
humanity when it forms “part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”115 
Whereas “widespread” relates to the scale of the attack, requiring a 
large scale action against multiple victims, “systematic” implies pre-
meditation by an organized group, enforcing a common policy.116 By 
allowing the attack to be “widespread” or “systematic,” rather than re-
quiring both conditions, the Rome Statute is broadening international 
law’s perception of rape. 
 The Rome Statute’s language, however, is deceivingly broad. In 
particular, article 7(2)(a) clarifies “attack directed against any civilian 
population” to mean “a course of conduct involving the multiple com-
mission of acts . . . pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organiza-
tional policy to commit such attack.”117 By equating “attack” with “a 
State or organizational policy,” the Statute renders the choice between 
“widespread” and “systematic” meaningless, ensuring that a crime 
against humanity will actually require that rape is not only widespread 
during an armed conflict, but also that it be “systematic” —that is, a 
State or group policy.118 
 These “gaps” in the international community’s perception of the 
nature and gravity of rape, as well as the almost complete lack of en-
forcement that will be shown in Part II, call into question the general 
acclaim that they represent, in any real sense, a break from the past. 
Indeed, while rape was not given an explicit definition long before 
the late 1990s, communities (both national and international) have 
been aware of occurrences of rape in armed conflicts, adopted a 
number of laws condemning it as illegal, and, in some instances, even 
prosecuted individuals on charges of rape during wartime.119 
 Thus, for example, Homer’s Iliad, Poussin’s 1637 masterpiece, 
Rape of the Sabine Women, and various passages from the Old Testament 
all provide “testaments to the tragedy of rape in historical and cultural 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1). 
116 See McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 654. 
117 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(2)(a). 
118 See McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 654 (observing that the Rome Stat-
ute actually “raises the threshold requirements” for rape to constitute a crime against hu-
manity). 
119 See Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under In-
ternational Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 288, 299 
(2003) (noting that rape has been acknowledged for centuries and was prohibited in war 
by custom before it was ever codified). 
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memory.”120 Also, in the 1300s, Italian jurist, Lucas de Penna, “urged 
that wartime rape be punished as severely as peacetime rape.”121 Simi-
larly, the sixteenth century jurist, Alberico Gentili, upon analyzing the 
literature of wartime rape, concluded that “it was unlawful to rape 
women in wartime, even if the women were combatants.”122 Here, 
Gentili’s position that even women who are combatants should be 
contemplated under provisions acknowledging and punishing rape 
represents a broader vision of international protection than currently 
provided for in international law concerning rape in armed conflicts. 
 The first documented account of an individual being charged for 
rape in wartime occured in 1474 when Peter van Hagenbach, a knight 
and military officer, was charged with rape and sentenced to death by 
an international military court consisting of twenty-seven judges.123 In 
1863, instructions signed by President Abraham Lincoln to Union 
forces in the Civil War, commonly referred to as the Lieber Code, 
contained two provisions concerning rape in armed conflict: Article 
44 declared that “all rape . . . [is] prohibited under the penalty of 
death,”124 and Article 47 asserted that rape is “not only punishable as 
at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer 
punishment shall be preferred.”125 Only eleven years later, in 1874, 
suggestions began to surface calling for an international criminal tri-
bunal, primarily from the non-government community.126 By the First 
International Peace Conference in the Hague in 1899, governments 
had begun discussing this idea,127 culminating in the declaration by 
the 1907 Hague Conventions and Regulations that sexual violence was 
                                                                                                                      
120 See, e.g., Pilch, supra note 15, at 100; see also Joshua H. Joseph, Rethinking Yamashita: 
Holding Military Leaders Accountable for Wartime Rape, 28 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 107, 108–09 
(2007) (quoting passage from Zechariah 14:2 (King James) as an example of rape in the 
Old Testament). 
121 Askin, supra note 119, at 299. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Francis Lieber, The Lieber Code of 1863: Instructions for the Govern-
ment of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, art. 44 
(Apr. 24, 1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#sec1 (rec-
ommending that rape be punished by death “or such other severe punishment as may 
seem adequate for the gravity of the offense”). 
125 Id. at art. 47 (saying that rape “committed by an American soldier in a hostile coun-
try . . . are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted 
the severer punishment shall be preferred”). 
126 McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 637. 
127 See id. 
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prohibited under the principle that “family honour and rights . . . 
must be respected.”128 
 While only minimally enforced, the War Crimes Commission, es-
tablished by the major allied powers after World War I, also produced 
a list of thirty-two non-exhaustive violations, including “rape” and 
“abduction of girls and women for the purpose of forced prostitu-
tion.”129 In contrast, neither the Charter for the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) nor the Charter for the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) specifically mentioned 
“rape” or “sexual assault.”130 The IMTFE, however, did include rape 
within the crimes charged in the indictments.131 Similarly, the Nur-
emberg Tribunal contemplated rape as a form of torture stating that 
“[m]any women and girls in their teens were separated from the rest 
of the internees . . . and locked in separate cells, where the unfortu-
nate creatures were subjected to particularly outrageous forms of tor-
ture. They were raped, their breasts cut off . . . .”132 Another transcript 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal reported that “women were subjected to 
the same treatment as men. To the physical pain, the sadism of the 
torturers added the moral anguish, especially mortifying for a woman, 
or a young girl, of being stripped nude by her torturers. Pregnancy 
did not save them from lashes.”133 
 Furthermore, the Allied Powers also erected a second series of mili-
tary trials at the conclusion of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, con-
ducted under the authority of Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10).134 
                                                                                                                      
128 See Askin, supra note 119, at 300 (quoting Convention Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 
461, art. XLVI). 
129 Id. (citing U.N. War Crimes Commission, 13 Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals 122, 124 (1949); History of the U.N. War Crimes Commission 34 (United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, ed. 1948); Commission on the Responsibility of the Au-
thors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary 
Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted in 14 Am J. Int’l L. 95, 114 (1920)). 
130 Askin, supra note 119, at 301. 
131 See Campanaro, supra note 39, at 2563. 
132 See 7 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal 494 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Trials]; Campanaro, supra note 39, at 
2560. 
133 6 Nuremberg Trials, supra note 132, at 170. However, the recognition that rape 
may constitute torture is compromised in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s depiction of rape 
victims as “unfortunate creatures.” See 7 Nuremberg Trials, supra note 132,  at 494. 
134 See Campanaro, supra note 39, at 2565 (citing Allied Control Council Law No. 10, 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 
December 20, 1945 [hereinafter CCL10], in 3 Official Gazette of the Control Coun-
cil for Germany 49 (1946)). 
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Under CCL10, rape was explicitly listed as a crime against humanity.135 
CCL10 also expanded the reach of these courts to prosecute any person 
who committed a crime—not just those in authority.136 The courts, 
however, never included rape within any indictment issued.137 
 These documents—the Charters for the IMT and IMTFE, as well 
as CCL10—question not only the generally accepted notion that the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC represent any real “historic” break from the past, 
but also question the claim that international law may be seen as an 
enterprise, a project comprised of various stages, and marked by dates 
or events that chart international law’s development, or learning. More 
specifically, we might pose the question: do international human rights 
laws concerning rape in armed conflict have any significant merit or 
value? Can these definitions and new methods of criminalizing rape be 
recognized as having substance if they are not enforced in any mean-
ingful way? In short, movement may not necessarily equal progress. 
II. Is International Law Part of the Problem? Three 
Challenges to Liberal Humanitarianism in Practice 
 The ICTY and ICTR have not successfully prosecuted many cases 
on charges of rape.138 As of 2008, out of eighty-six total cases that have 
crossed before the ICTY, only seventeen alleged any form of sexual as-
sault.139 Furthermore, in the handful of cases which have received 
judgments, the guilty are often selected to serve their terms concur-
rently and enjoy the possibility of an early release two-thirds of the way 
through their sentence.140 Thus, for example, in Furundzija, even 
though the court found the accused guilty of rape and torture, it opted 
                                                                                                                      
135 See CCL10, supra note 134, art. II (defining “Crimes against Humanity”). 
136 See id. 
137 See Patricia Viseur Sellers, Rape Under International Law, in War Crimes: The Leg-
acy of Nuremberg 159, 162 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). 
138 See ICTY Cases and Judgments, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
139 See id. The number charges of rapes is based on the number of instances where 
rape appears as a “Count” in these indictments. Evidence of rape in the fact findings was 
not considered a formal allegation of rape. See id. 
140See, e.g., Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 292–296 (holding that the sentence 
for rape should be “serve[d] concurrently with the sentence imposed for torture”); Case 
Information Sheet: “Lasva Valley” (IT-95-17/1) Anto Furundzija, available at 
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rundzija was released after serving a little over six years of a ten year sentence). 
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to allow him to serve both convictions at the same time.141 The Presi-
dent of the ICTY granted him early release in August 2004.142 
 In comparison, of seventy-four indictments issued by the ICTR, 
only twenty-eight involved any charge of rape or sexual violence.143 In-
deed, in the much heralded Akayesu case, despite documentation from 
human rights and women’s organizations of “extensive evidence of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence throughout Rwanda,” the 
ICTR only amended the indictment to include allegations of rape when 
a witness testified on the stand concerning her rape experiences.144 In 
response, Judge Navanethem Pillay encouraged the court to convene 
the trial until the Office of the Prosecutor could “investigate the sexual 
violence charges and consider amending the indictment.”145 The 
Akayesu judgment was the only successful guilty verdict for rape charges 
or sexual violence between 1998 and 2002.146 Three years later, only 
two other cases resulted in a guilty verdict concerning rape.147 
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146 Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff, Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, 
Analysis of Trends in Sexual Violence Prosecutions in Indictments by the International Criminal 
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ysisoftrends_en.php (noting only four indictments included sexual violence charges be-
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147 See Binaifer Nowrojee, United Nations Research Institute for Social De-
velopment, “Your Justice Is Too Slow”: Will the ICTR Fail Rwanda’s Rape Victims? 
3 (2005) (noting that other than Akayesu, a rape conviction was only upheld for Laurent 
Semanza as of April 2004); Rebecca L. Haffajee, Comment, Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and 
Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory, 29 Harv. J.L. & 
Gender 201, 210–12 (explaining that the definition of rape was re-expanding in leading to 
a rape conviction in Prosecutor v. Muhimana). 
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 The ICC also appears to be reluctant to bring charges of rape and 
sexual violence. Since its birth in 2002, the ICC only opened investiga-
tions in four areas: in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic 
of Uganda, Darfur, and the Central African Republic.148 Yet there have 
been many armed conflicts since the mid-1990s, and in a number of 
these conflicts, women were raped, often in large numbers.149 The 
ICC’s reach into only four situations suggests that widespread rapes oc-
curring in other armed conflicts are somehow less important, at least 
on a pragmatic level. The ICC’s limited scope is also evidenced by the 
fact that the Commission only named fifty-one individuals as suspects of 
grave international crimes in Darfur, though reports suggests that many 
times that number were sexually assaulted and raped.150 
 This Part examines some of the possible reasons why the ICC, the 
ICTY, and the ICTR have failed to effectively prosecute rape allega-
tions or ameliorate the conditions for women in armed conflict situa-
tions. This Article contends that these events, these failures in vision 
and practice, call in to question the general exuberance of the legal 
community to represent the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR as somehow a “his-
toric,” or “unprecedented,” break from the past. This Article bridges 
this distance, or “gap,” established by the standard account in the fo-
cus on the before and after of the early 1990s. In doing so, this Article 
will untangle the rape experiences and events occurring in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda from the oppressive mantle of the general in-
sistence that international legal history tells the story of international 
law as a pluralistic, humanitarian project.151 
                                                                                                                      
148 International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases. 
html (last visited on Nov. 6, 2008). 
149 van Niekerk, supra note 39. 
150 See Press Release, International Criminal Court, List of Names of Suspects in Darfur 
Opened by the ICC OTP (Apr. 11, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/101. 
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151 See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Paradox of International Adjudication: Developments 
in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, 
and the International Criminal Court, 25 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 551, 561 (2000) (stat-
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twentieth century is testament to the unprecedented expansion of the international judi-
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man rights”). 
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A. Colonialism and the State 
 One of the principal obstacles facing the effective enforcement 
of international human rights laws concerning rape in armed conflict 
is the legal profession’s continued adherence to the notion that state 
sovereignty (the preservation of states’ territorial and administrative 
identity) is the guiding principle of international law. This deference 
of human rights atrocities to national interests and independence is 
rooted in, or at least mimics, nineteenth century jurists’ conception of 
international law. In the nineteenth century, the full rights of nation-
states, expressed in the term “sovereignty,” was crystallized as a doc-
trine, in large part, to facilitate colonial ambitions among the West-
ern-European nation-states.152 The colonial project required that in-
ternational law generate a “continuous construction of difference” in 
an “endless task of [Western European institutions and values] be-
coming universal.”153 In short, the late nineteenth century was a pe-
riod of imperialism, and it was within this soil that the Western nation-
state came to full fruition, juxtaposed against its non-European coun-
terparts, as the central tenet of international law. 
  The Mandate System under the League of Nations did not fun-
damentally challenge the notion of “state sovereignty” or the underly-
ing gap created by nineteenth century jurists between the “civilized” 
and “uncivilized” countries. Recognizing that “the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization,” the 
Mandate Article provided for a three-tiered system of state administra-
tion.154 The mandate territories were “classified according to their 
degree of advancement.”155 The victorious Western European coun-
tries were designated as mandatory powers, enjoying “broad powers” 
in the mandate territories.156 In no small part, the power relationships 
and assignment of peoplehood, identity and progress under the colo-
nial framework had survived, continuing to reinforce disparities of 
power between European and non-European states in the name of 
                                                                                                                      
152 See Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, 
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 513, 514 
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153 Id. at 519. 
154 Id. at 524–25. 
155 Id. at 525. 
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extending benevolent protection and guidance to less stable territo-
ries. 
 State sovereignty was given priority under the U.N. Charter again 
on the postulation of a gap. This gap was not between “civilized” ver-
sus “uncivilized,” or “mandatory powers” versus “mandate territories,” 
but instead centered on the “images of the relationship between war 
and peace . . . associated with an image of the [international] institu-
tion as the opposite of the social breakdown of war.”157 The emphasis 
on law as the method of providing order to “social breakdown” is ex-
pressed in the general assumption that the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC are 
bulwarks against the atrocities of wars that occur outside the core na-
tion-states of the international order. In essence, the current ap-
proach continues the hierarchal sets of relationships between Amer-
ica and Western European states and the rest of the world, and 
continues its support for the status quo, for a return to order, to 
“normality” —in short, to securing and maintaining relationships 
rooted in a colonial past. 
 Thus, under the current international legal order, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council has been afforded a wide range of powers to “determine 
and respond to threats to international peace.”158 Article 29 of the 
U.N. Charter, for example, authorizes the Security Council to initiate 
“such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of 
its functions.”159 Furthermore, article 24(1) provides: 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.160 
 These provisions effectively allow the five nation-state members 
of the Security Council significant input regarding international law’s 
conception of what constitutes a legitimate threat to international 
peace and security, which territories are included within the interna-
tional order, and how disturbances should be addressed. Further-
more, article 42 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council 
to “impose its decisions through the use of force where necessary to 
                                                                                                                      
157 See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 841, 846 (1987). 
158 See McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 640. 
159 See U.N. Charter art. 29. 
160 Id. art. 24, ¶ 1. 
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restore international stability.”161 In this framework, the focus on rape 
victims in armed conflict is displaced by the needs of securing the na-
tion-state framework, and more specifically, the hierarchal structure 
of these nations within the international community. America and 
Western European countries continue to define the contours of not 
only international law, but also what constitutes civilization. 
 Thus, for example, Security Council Resolution 808 recognizes 
that the ICTY is legally founded pursuant to Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the U.N., which allows the Security Council to take forceful 
measures to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”162 
In other words, the ICTY is constitutionally-attuned to human rights 
interests, such as rapes in armed conflict, only to the degree they cor-
respond with the ICTY’s principal mission to instill peace and the 
conditions of civilization.163 
 The ICC is also tethered to the authority of the Security Council 
and its constituents. Under article 13 of the Rome Statute, the ICC may 
only exercise jurisdiction over situations that are referred to the Office 
of the Prosecutor by: 1) a State-party to the statute; 2) the U.N. Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to the U.N.; or 3) the 
Prosecutor acting proprio motu—on their own initiative.164 The discre-
tion of the State-parties and the Prosecutor, however, is only permitted 
if the territory in which the crime occurred or in which the perpetrator 
is a national has consented to the jurisdiction of the Court.165 The ju-
risdictional reach of the states or Prosecutor, therefore, does not cover 
situations where atrocities are being committed in a non-consenting 
                                                                                                                      
161 McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 640; U.N. Charter art. 42 (declaring 
that when measures in article 41, such as “complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations,” are ineffective, the actions that are available to the Security Council expand to 
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162 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
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their prosecution of human rights abuses or ensuring justice, but “in contributing to the 
lasting peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the progress made 
since their inception.” See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 2. 
164 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 13 (providing the jurisdictional limits of the 
Rome Statute). 
165 See id. art. 12 (stating that only countries who “become a Party to this Statute” are 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction). 
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state by that state’s actors, which may often be the case. The Security 
Council, however, according to article 12(2) of the Rome Statute, is not 
subject to these restrictions so long as the members on the Security 
Council are exercising their discretionary powers in the interests of the 
“maintenance of international peace and security.”166 In aspiring to 
“peace” and “security,” the Rome Statute also gives the Security Council 
the right to halt any ICC investigation or proceeding for a period of 
one year.167 Pursuant to article 16, the Security Council can renew its 
veto powers at the end of each year period indefinitely, or alternatively, 
reinstate an investigation that it has put on hold.168 In effect, the Rome 
Statute constitutionalizes the preeminence of the Security Council, and 
implicitly, the authority of its constituent nation-states and their inter-
ests. 
 Indeed, the United States has openly challenged the notion of the 
Court’s role extending beyond the consent of either the Security Coun-
cil or the consent of the involved states. During the negotiations over 
the Rome Statute, for example, the head of the U.S. delegation stated: 
It is simply and logically untenable to expose the largest de-
ployed military force in the world, stationed across the globe 
to help maintain international peace and security and to de-
fend U.S. allies and friends, to the jurisdiction of a criminal 
court the U.S. Government has not yet joined and whose au-
thority over U.S. citizens the United States does not yet rec-
ognize. . . . The theory that an individual U.S. soldier acting 
on foreign territory should be exposed to ICC jurisdiction if 
his alleged crime occurs on that territory . . . [is] nonsensi-
cal.169 
 Even more blatantly, in 2003, the U.S. representative to the Secu-
rity Council pronounced that the “ICC is not the law” since the “fun-
damental principle of international law [is] the need for a State to 
                                                                                                                      
166 See U.N. Charter, art. 24, para. 1; Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 12(2). But see 
McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 640–42 (arguing that the requirement of a 
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167 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 16 (stating “[n]o investigation or prosecution 
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a resolution . . . [that] has requested the Court to that effect”). 
168 See id. 
169 McCormack & Robertson, supra note 18, at 644 (quoting David Scheffer, Develop-
ments in International Criminal Law: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 
Am. J. Int’l L. 12, 18 (1999)). 
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consent if it is to be bound.”170 In explaining the role of the ICC in 
relation to the mission of the U.N. Security Council, the representa-
tive continued: 
We all know that United Nations operations are important if 
the Council is to discharge its primary responsibility for main-
taining or restoring international peace and security. We also 
all know that it is not always easy to recruit contributors, and 
that it often takes courage on the part of political leaders to 
join military operations established or authorized by the 
Council. It is important that Member States not add concern 
about ICC jurisdiction to the difficulty of participating.171 
In other words, the political needs of the Security Council in “maintain-
ing or restoring international peace and security” trump any concerns 
over human rights abuses. Indeed, the statement implicitly acknowl-
edges that these atrocities will occur in these “military operations” — 
why else would the ICC add “concern” and “difficulty” to political lead-
ers joining? In this context, provisions concerning rape in armed con-
flict, as well as human rights in general, are made instruments to the 
political aims and efforts of the Security Council. In short, rape may 
continue, in large part, with impunity. 
 To achieve its aims, the United States has taken a number of meas-
ures. In 2002, it passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
(ASPA), barring U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations 
unless the president can “certify to Congress that U.S. service members 
are protected” from ICC jurisdiction.172 In addition, the United States 
actively negotiates bilateral agreements with ICC parties pursuant to 
which they agree not to surrender U.S. nationals to the ICC without 
U.S. consent.173 By June 2003, thirty-eight states had “publicly an-
nounced the signing of such agreements with the United States,” while a 
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number of other states signed such agreements confidentially.174 In July 
2003, the United States suspended all military assistance to thirty-five 
states that refused to enter into similar agreements.175 Moreover, the 
ASPA originally prohibited any military assistance to the majority of 
states that have ratified the ICC treaty, although this was repealed in 
2008.176 Finally, in 2002 and 2003, the United States also prompted the 
other governments on the Security Council to invoke article 16 and re-
quest the ICC delay investigations and proceedings for the year.177 
 The presence of armed conflicts and documentation of wide-
spread rape in a number of these countries that have agreed not to 
turn U.S. soldiers over to the ICC questions whether international 
human rights are actually “universal” in the sense that they apply to all 
nations, and not just those countries which remain outside the core 
fraternity of nation-states or are unwilling to follow their directives.178 
Just as the notion of civilization and development legitimized colonial 
ambitions in the nineteenth century and the interwar period, the 
duty to bring peace and order to armed conflicts that threaten the 
                                                                                                                      
174 U.S. Bilateral Agreements Relating to ICC, supra note 172, at 201. Among the “publicly 
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charges is that the “culprits are [the] international peace-keeping officers” so that there is 
“often . . . no official record of their involvement.” Karkera, supra note 96, at 224. If in-
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international order justifies soldiers and other personnel endorsed by 
the Security Council to act with a great deal of immunity. 
 As international legal purveyors and practitioners, we might ask 
ourselves how deep this critique runs. In other words, is international 
law’s problem one of principally outside political interests or is the 
problem more fundamental to the discipline? Could it be that the 
very concepts we so often hold up to battle “injustice” are actually part 
of a continuing model of colonial domination and empire building? 
 This questioning may also apply to us on a more personal level. 
Have we really become more enlightened in both our perception and 
intervention into the peripheries of our world? After all, did not in-
ternational lawyers in the late nineteenth century feel civilized and 
morally correct? Did not the Berlin Conference look to the well-being 
and material benefit of the “African” peoples? And again, did not in-
ternational lawyers in the interwar period under the Mandate System 
celebrate their invention of ethnic minority rights? And what do we 
imagine international lawyers felt about themselves and the discipline 
after the defeat of Hitler and the establishment of the U.N. and the 
foundational tenet of self-determination? Did these lawyers also place 
the massacre of the Algerian people by French military with the inde-
pendence of France in the same evaluation of history and their disci-
pline? Did the decolonization process illuminate the danger when 
international lawyers turn uncritical to the enlightened morality and 
truth of their calling or merely that international law is a story of pro-
gress? And if decolonization was a story of progress, what about the 
fact that many of those very same decolonized countries now suffer 
from deep internal and external strife and siege, continuing to oper-
ate largely as a market for cheap labor and natural resources for 
Western interests? In what ways might our very conceptions of human 
rights, self-determination, sovereignty, or even the nation-state model 
be a continuation of empire, and ourselves, in our thinking and ac-
tions, as colonialists? 
B. Western Efficiency 
 A number of policies in the late 1990s that aimed to make the tri-
bunals more “efficient” and “professional” have undermined the credi-
bility of the court and its effectiveness in redressing rape victims.179 The 
majority of these policies were implemented shortly after the replace-
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ment of Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour in 1999 with Swiss prosecutor 
Carla Del Ponte. Under the post-1999 regime, the ICTR’s Office of the 
Prosecutor underwent a “restructuring plan,”180 in which the Investiga-
tions Division was “totally reorganized” to “streamline” the Tribunal 
from existence by 2010.181 
 Thus, in 2001, one of the principal investigation teams assigned 
to sexual violence was dismantled.182 Without field workers and inves-
tigators readily available for rape victims and aware of their needs, the 
ICTR was unable to encourage rape victims to step forward as wit-
nesses.183 As a result, since 2001, the ICTR has experienced a sharp 
decrease in incriminations for sexual violence in its initial indict-
ments.184 In addition, sexual violence and rape indictments were pur-
posely left out of a number of indictments on the grounds that they 
would expend too much of the tribunal’s resources and time and they 
are often tainted by less than “fully substantiated” evidence.185 Yet, this 
tendency to produce less than “fully substantiated” evidence was itself 
the product of those very policies meant to “streamline” the prosecu-
tion process in the name of “efficiency.” 
 To ensure “professionalism” and guarantee that the ICTR was able 
to wrap up its activities by 2010, the Tribunal focused on finding ways to 
“avoid the additional delays caused by preparing the cases, amending 
the indictments, and the swarm of procedural motions and interlocu-
tory appeals that such an intervention generates.”186 Rape cases, how-
ever, were notoriously difficult to prove due to the fact that the events 
had occurred years beforehand.187 Likewise, limiting the ability of 
prosecutors to amend their indictments (such as in lieu of witness testi-
mony) ignored the fact that amending indictments had proven an es-
sential tool of the tribunal in bringing attention to rape crimes. Charges 
of rape, for example, had to be amended into the original indictments 
in a number of ICTR cases, including Bagilishema (1995), Akayesu 
(1996), Bagosora (1996), Nsengiyumva (1996), and Musema (1996).188 In 
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at least one case, the judges did not initiate an investigation into allega-
tions of rape even though witnesses testified to sexual violence.189 In an-
other case, the accused were not indicted for acts of sexual violence de-
spite documentation by women’s non-governmental organizations in 
Rwanda that they had occurred.190 By discouraging the “preparing” of 
cases and “amending” indictments,  these new policies implicitly oper-
ated to exclude rape victims from the Tribunal’s proceedings. 
 In an effort to “streamline” prosecutions, the ICTR and ICTY 
have also adopted other administrative strategies. For instance, in re-
sponse to criticism that the tribunals moved too slowly, at the end of 
the twentieth century, the Offices of the Prosecutors began attempt-
ing to merge cases and try the accused as a group.191 By grouping the 
cases, however, rape and sexual violence indictments dropped.192 In 
fact, rape indictments have occasionally been used as bargaining chips 
whereby the accused agrees to a guilty plea concerning certain charges, 
on the condition that the sexual violence or rape charges are dis-
missed.193 For example, in the Serushago case, the ICTR withdrew its 
rape count in exchange for the accused admitting guilt on a number 
of other non-related charges.194 In this context, victims become ex-
pendable and “deliberately sacrificed on the altar of judicial expedi-
ency.”195 This was explicitly admitted by the current Registrar of the 
ICTY, Hans Holthuis, as he stated during his address to the Hague: 
The aim of joining these cases is to substantially reduce the 
length of proceedings by inter alia reducing the length of the 
prosecution case, reducing the number of witnesses, avoid-
ing the repetition of evidence, avoiding the overlap of wit-
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ness testimony, and reducing the expense of witnesses travel-
ing repeatedly to The Hague for testimony.196 
 Furthermore, both tribunals have made clear that their prosecu-
tors will only indict high level offenders, which also hinders the success-
ful prosecution of armed conflict rape. In 1998, for instance, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY stated her strategy was centered on “maintain-
ing an investigative focus on persons holding higher levels of responsi-
bility, or on those who have been personally responsible for the excep-
tionally brutal or otherwise extremely serious offences.”197 Under this 
approach, however, prosecutors in the ICTY are forced to draw lines 
between “exceptionally brutal” crimes and “lesser” crimes, lines which 
may not actually exist, legal fictions to once again “postulate a gap” — 
here, between those crimes that deserve to be addressed by the interna-
tional community and other crimes that are somehow less demanding 
on the international conscience, and hence, relegated to the domestic 
courts.198 
 The decision to relinquish cases to the domestic courts has been 
widely supported throughout the international community and espe-
cially by women’s non-governmental organizations in Rwanda and the 
Security Council.199 Pursuant to Resolution 1503, the ICTR and ICTY 
are to conclude trials of first instance by the end of 2008, and con-
clude any appeals by the end of 2010 (this directive is commonly re-
ferred to as the “Completion Strategies”).200 Thus, in June 2005, the 
Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR, Justice Hassan B. Jallow, stated that he 
was “pleased to report progress . . . [in the] strategy of referral of 
cases to national jurisdiction [as] endorsed by the Security Coun-
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cil.”201 By May 2005, the ICTR handed over approximately forty-five 
cases, most of which were still in only the investigation stage, to the 
national Rwandan courts.202 Non-governmental organizations advo-
cating on behalf of women’s rights in Rwanda applauded this shift, 
not in the name of “streamlining” the cases (though they did criticize 
the slow pace of the Tribunal’s proceedings), but in hope that the lo-
cal courts may more adequately address the specific needs and protec-
tion of the raped women in their population.203 
 Unfortunately, the ICTR was discredited by the fact that at least 
forty-one defense investigators working for the Tribunal were wanted 
or under investigation by the Government of Rwanda and various 
women’s rights organizations for crimes related to the 1994 geno-
cide.204 Furthermore, the ability of these investigators to gain access to 
rape victims in private settings not only questioned the “possibility of 
rendering an impartial and truthful justice,” but perhaps more impor-
tantly, the ICTR’s guarantee to protect rape victims and witnesses.205 
For example, shortly after giving testimony in the Akayesu and Ruta-
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ganda judgments, two female witnesses were assassinated.206 Also, in 
1997, a Washington Post editorial reported that “Hutu extremists mur-
dered a witness, her husband and seven children after she appeared 
before the U.N. trials and was promised protection.”207 
 Despite the fact that these threats to witnesses were a “reoccurring 
problem,” in 2000 the ICTR dismantled many functions of its Support 
Programme for Witnesses and Potential Witnesses, including the com-
plete abandonment of “rehousing [projects], development assistance 
and reconciliation.”208 Ironically, the very policies meant to facilitate 
more successful prosecution of rape crimes ended up discouraging the 
victims to come forward. In effect, rape victims in Rwanda were si-
lenced. 
 In early 2002, the associations for genocide widows (AVEGA) and 
genocide survivors (IBUKA) suspended cooperation with the ICTR, 
and issued a statement that they were “disillusioned with [its] function-
ing.”209 Shortly afterwards, the Rwandan government joined the boy-
cott.210 Rape victims and witnesses were encouraged to find legal re-
course through the national courts.211 However, the problem with this 
change was that the “already feeble national justice system” had been 
decimated by the genocide in 1994.212 It was not ready to handle the 
more than 120,000 persons in custody on charges related to the geno-
cide. By the end of the genocide, Rwanda “counted only twenty judicial 
personnel responsible for criminal investigations and only nineteen 
lawyers”;213 by the end of 1997 that number had only risen to a total of 
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448 judges serving in national courts.214 To respond to this backlog of 
cases, the Rwandan government adapted a “community conflict resolu-
tion mechanism, known as gacaca, to the pursuit of genocide prosecu-
tions.”215 In 2001, the Organic Laws of January 26, 2001 Setting Up 
“Gacaca Jurisdiction” and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Consti-
tuting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed 
between October 1, 1990 and December 21, 1994 (2001 Gacaca Laws) 
established approximately 11,000 gacaca courts.216 
 The gacaca and Rwandan national courts (also known as classical 
courts), however, in their pursuit to bring justice to rape victims may 
actually be excluding them from the judicial process. In fact, the tradi-
tional gacaca court system—on which the modern gacaca system is 
based—was essentially a “more informal dispute resolution mecha-
nism.”217 The current system, which departs from the traditional gacaca 
system with more comprehensive procedural powers to prosecute, and 
punish genocide crimes, still is aimed to “enlist active popular partici-
pation in public hearings as a means to facilitate truth-telling, account-
ability, and national reconciliation.”218 To this end, until 2004 legislative 
reforms, rape survivors were required under the gacaca system to testify 
either publicly or by a written statement before an assembly of a mini-
mum of one hundred community members.219 This public component 
may very well discourage female victims from stepping forward to tes-
tify due to the social stigma and personal nature attached to rape.220 
 The gacaca system also presents significant procedural obstacles to 
women coming forward to testify. There are seven pretrial phases un-
dertaken by the gacaca courts.221 During the sixth stage, pursuant to 
the 2001 Gacaca Laws, rape witnesses must either testify in front of the 
general commission or by camera before the accused and a panel of 
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nineteen judges.222 Once the rape survivors have undergone the seven 
stages, they are then sent to the national courts, the Tribunals of First 
Instance, where they must again participate in retrying the accused.223 
Furthermore, while the current 2004 Gacaca Laws prohibit individuals 
accused of rape to be eligible for a provincial release, the law does not 
prohibit such individuals from being released if “they were never for-
mally accused” or “did not subsequently confess to rape.”224 In a num-
ber of situations, accused persons have also been freed because “au-
thorities did not register the rape charges” even though the sexual 
violence survivors had told the police of the crime.225 Moreover, the 
gacaca laws require that any rape case that had not already proceeded 
to the Tribunals of First Instance had to be readmitted to the gacaca 
system by the rape survivor, who is then obligated to revisit all seven 
pretrial stages.226 
 These changes have produced few rape indictments or judg-
ments.227 According to a survey by Human Rights Watch of one thou-
sand cases, “only thirty-two [cases] included charges of rape or sexual 
torture.”228 In another survey, Lawyers Without Borders reported that 
of “1051 persons tried on charges of genocide or related crimes in 
1999,” only “forty-nine persons were prosecuted for rape or sexual tor-
ture, nine of whom were convicted of some form of sexual violence.”229 
Likewise, between its inception in June 2002 and September 2004, the 
gacaca courts only registered approximately 134 cases including rape or 
sexual torture indictments out of more than 3000 non-sexual violence 
crimes.230 Moreover, a number of rape witnesses have reported being 
threatened, and sometimes attacked after testifying in the gacaca pro-
ceedings.231 
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C. Reparations 
 The need for reparations in countries that have been ravaged by 
armed conflict rape is great. In the late 1990s the U.N. Development 
Program reported that “women’s work burden was 113 percent that of 
men” in the 130 least-developed countries.232 In Rwanda, approxi-
mately sixty percent of the country is below the national poverty line, 
wherein women are at a particular disadvantage.233 A 2001 survey con-
ducted the Rwandan Ministry of Health and the National Population 
Office found that approximately thirty-six percent of Rwandan fami-
lies are headed by a woman.234 Ninety-seven percent of Rwandan 
women “provide for themselves and their families through subsistence 
agriculture.”235 Despite recent property law reform, women are “de-
nied equal rights to land,” and are often forced into prostitution to 
support themselves.236 
 Rwanda also continues to lack adequate health care services. The 
Rwandan government estimates there are only 300 doctors in the 
country.237 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports 
that eighty-eight percent of women must walk more than one hour to 
reach the nearest health center.238 Many of these women, however, are 
either too sick to make the journey or cannot afford to sacrifice time 
from subsistence farming and child care. Furthermore, under the 
current regime, women are required to pay for public transportation 
to the health center, and unless they qualify for assistance, women 
must also pay for any necessary services and medication.239 Thus, for 
example, the Rwandan government estimated in 2004 that, while ap-
proximately 75,000 Rwandans are in need of antiretroviral (ARV) 
therapy (many of them rape survivors), only 3524 Rwandans are actu-
ally being treated with the necessary medications.240 
 However, these desperate economic and health conditions have 
been largely ignored by the Tribunals or the ICC. The Statutes of the 
ICTR and ICTR clearly deny victims any right to reparations. The ICTY 
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Statute, for example, states that “[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial 
Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment . . . [i]n addition to impris-
onment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and 
proceeds acquired during criminal conduct, including by means of du-
ress, to their rightful owners.”241 
 In 2000, ICTY and ICTR judges issued an official announcement 
to explain the reason the Tribunals do not offer women reparation, 
stating that “[t]he judges agree with the principle of compensation 
for victims but believe that the responsibility for processing and assess-
ing claims for compensation should not lie with the Tribunal but 
other agencies within the United Nations systems.”242 In other words, 
the economic chaos that rape victims often experience is essentially 
political, not legal, and hence outside the realm of international law. 
The judges had postulated a difference or gap: the desperate eco-
nomic and health conditions of rape survivors should be contem-
plated separately from the legal redress issue. This approach has also 
been adopted at the national levels. In Rwanda, for example, the na-
tional courts have been remiss to execute any judgment including 
damages for the victims.243 
 On the other hand, the Rome Statute of the ICC explicitly allows 
for civil damages to be awarded in international criminal cases, as ar-
ticle 75 states: 
The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, 
or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, 
either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional cir-
cumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims.244 
While this represents the first time the international community has 
officially recognized the legal right of rape victims to seek reparations, 
when the perpetrator is unable to satisfy the declared damages, the 
victim’s only recourse is to apply for reparations through a Trust 
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Fund.245 For these women, their day in court becomes their “justice,” 
in essence, a legal fiction offered as compensation for their experi-
ences. Moreover, the Rome Statute’s language restricting the Court to 
contemplating civil damages only “upon request” or “in exceptional 
circumstances,” suggests that somehow reparations are still secondary 
to judicial proclamations of innocence or guilt.246 
 In addition to being disadvantaged by the limited availability of 
reparations, rape victims are required to overcome a series of proce-
dural obstacles to “request” reparations. First, rape victims must “send a 
written application to the Court Registrar and more precisely to the 
Victims’ Participation and Reparation Section [VPRS].”247 In turn, the 
VPRS must then “submit the application to the competent Chamber 
which decides on the arrangements for the victims’ participation in the 
proceedings.”248 At this point, the Chamber will decide on the merit of 
victims’ claims based on the amount of evidence the women provide to 
prove “they are victims of crimes which come under the competence of 
the Court in the proceedings commenced before it.”249 
 These procedural and evidentiary requirements will undoubtedly 
bar many women from the legal process, especially rape victims. Few 
women will be able to offer physical proof of rape or present witnesses 
due to the fact that many of these witnesses are either dead or unwill-
ing to come forward. More importantly, these requirements suggest 
that the economic and health conditions of Rwandan and Bosnian 
women are not a legal concern, but still political. Constraining the 
scope of reparations to a relative minority of women from these coun-
tries suggests that the economic and health conditions of the majority 
of these women is outside the aims or ambitions of law. Those women 
who do not meet the conditions of the ICC are essentially considered 
not to be victims—at least not in a legal sense. The provisions for 
reparations within the Rome Statute end up excluding, in ideological 
and practical terms, the survivors for which these provisions are sup-
posed to be structured. 
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 Furthermore, the administrative powers allotted to the ICC in 
dispersing any contributions or awards for victims may be detrimental 
to the well-being of rape victims in armed conflicts. To administer re-
paration awards and contributions, article 79 of the Rome Statute es-
tablishes a “Trust Fund . . . for the benefit of victims of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims.”250 
The Trust Fund is administered by the Registry.251 The Fund is also 
supervised by an independent Board of Directors.252 Among its pow-
ers, the Board has discretion over whether or not the Victim’s Trust 
Fund will accept various voluntary monetary contributions.253 
 The Court has the option of granting individual or collective 
reparations.254 In practice, the ICC has indicated that it will most 
likely favor group trials, once again in the name of “efficiency,” as it 
has declared that “[i]n order to ensure the efficiency of proceedings, 
particularly in cases where there are a large number of victims, the 
competent Chamber may ask victims to choose a shared legal repre-
sentative.”255 This is significant because in cases where “collective 
reparations” are in order, the Victim’s Trust Fund may order that 
reparations be paid not to the actual survivors, but instead to “an in-
ter-governmental, international, or national organization.”256 
 The characterization of the administrative organ overseeing repa-
rations as a “Trust Fund” reinforces the notion of women as “wards” 
under the protection of the Board of Directors and the ICC Registry. 
The message is that women are essentially unsuitable to be entrusted 
with the money themselves even though the funds were the direct 
product of these women’s testimony and structured upon the intent of 
dispersing these funds to the victims. The current policy alienates in its 
very attempt to assist. Moreover, the ICC policy reproduces colonial 
relationships through the very acts that are supposed to be signaling 
the inclusion of women more fully into the international order and a 
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more responsible version of state sovereignty (that is, pluralistic, non-
imperialistic international legal order). Women are once again subor-
dinated to the needs of the dominant international legal narrative. 
Conclusion: We, the Victors . . . 
 The standard approach views the U.N. regime established in the 
wake of World War II and de-colonization as monumental moments in 
the history of international law wherein international law shrugged 
off the lingering colonialist ambitions of nation states and absolute 
sovereignty in favor of a pluralistic, liberal, humanitarian character. As 
Antony Anghie explains: 
This development in turn is the basis of the claim— funda-
mentally important to the contemporary discipline of interna-
tional law and its legitimacy—that international law is truly 
universal, open, and cosmopolitan because it extends sover-
eignty to all states without making the invidious cultural dis-
tinctions between the civilized European and the uncivilized 
non-European that had served in the nineteenth century to 
exclude non-Europeans from the realm of sovereignty while 
subjecting them to colonialism.257 
 The common reliance on treating the armed conflicts in Yugosla-
via and Rwanda as moments which are distinct and “unprecedented” 
serves to justify the authority of international law in remedying the 
problem—international law is given a new subject to carry out its pro-
ject to universalize international legal structures and their normative 
rules and techniques. In turn, this demands novel legal techniques 
and institutions (the ICC, ICTY and ICTR) to deal with this unprece-
dented, aberrational moment. 
 This Article challenges this notion of the “unprecedented” to 
question the legitimacy of the dominant vision of international law as 
pluralistic and humanitarian. In both theoretical and practical terms, 
women continue to be excluded from the protection and guarantees of 
the international legal community. On the one hand, notions of com-
munity and the individual are displaced by the principle of the im-
pregnability of state sovereignty and the interests of the pre-eminent 
nations in maintaining “peace and security” in the international order. 
On the other hand, women are subordinated to the necessities of the 
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international legal narrative and its underlying assumption that inter-
national law is a project of inclusion (universalization) and moderniza-
tion (order, and implicitly, civilization). 
 However, the reality is that women cannot be lumped together in 
a homogenous “womanhood” anymore than the various occurrences 
whereby international law has been forced to reorganize itself due to 
unstable power relations can be drawn together in a clearly defined 
linear evolution. I have argued in this Article that each attunement, 
or act of inclusion, on the part of international law to women in 
raped conflicts (and projected to all women) corresponds with a si-
multaneous act of exclusion, which merely reemphasizes uneven rela-
tionships which are rooted in a patriarchal, colonial past.258 Specifi-
cally, in this Article, the inability of rape victims in armed conflicts to 
achieve virtually any real address by the international community is 
seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of international law and its grand 
narrative, or project. 
 Dislocating raped women in armed conflicts from the structure 
of the standard international legal history does not end the problem 
with international law, but only raises new questions. How, for in-
stance, can we “bring these perspectives together in a way that would 
not create a new grand narrative that would simply be the mirror im-
age of the canonical story?”259 In other words, can we discuss these 
occurrences in such a way that actually allows them an autonomous 
voice and at the same time resist the temptation to transform these 
“obliquely related” events into justifications of international law mere-
ly re-organized with a “new” purpose, or project?260 In short, how do 
we extricate our “knowledge” from the confines of legal analysis and 
revision? And, perhaps more importantly, is it enough for “history’s 
victors [to] muster the courage to look frankly, painfully, at the hor-
rors of its own past?”261 Where does such recognition leave us? After 
all, what does it mean to be heard? 
 The current moment is plagued by this tension between the hu-
manist and the realist within each of us: on the one hand, the desire 
to do something, on the other hand, the uncomfortable suspicion 
that benevolence is merely refurbished colonialism. My suspicion is 
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that often we tend to isolate these traits as two distinct personalities, 
and then pick allegiances. Or, as in Nathaniel Berman’s opinion, we 
assume the “critical” talk of the morning, but after lunch is out of the 
way, the humanitarian emerges because it is time to be practical and 
get something done. The challenge to legitimacy seems unable not to 
pose its own counter-project of legitimacy—the realist becomes the 
dreamer, the “critical genealogist” changes into the “institutional 
functionalist.” There is no escape from the shadows of colonialism. 
Reform—no matter how progressive or attuned to the peripheries— 
remains a postscript to colonialism, tainted with its imagination, and 
harnessed by its imperialist relationships of power. At the end of the 
day, we are where we started: left to choose between a gullible picture 
of international law marching forward, or being left out of the actual 
application of power, relegated to the remote theoretical outposts of 
international law (and principally, academia). 
 In this conception of competing personalities, we cannot escape 
the traditions of empire. But why must the “humanist” be gullible? Why 
must the “humanist” forever be like Coleridge’s ancient mariner 
doomed to spend eternity repeating his story of woe as repentance for 
his pride? Likewise, why must the “realist” critique remain at the pe-
ripheries of reform? It may be that the tension between the humanist 
and the realist is essentially not a problem of reform and the stigma of 
colonialism, but instead the inability of our imagination. Just as we 
must dissolve the barriers between the stories of Western inclusion and 
non-Western exclusion, we must also reconcile the “humanist” and the 
“realist,” not as two competing or contradicting personalities, but as 
complimentary aspects of the reformer’s psychology: our “humanist” 
attributes sparking our desire for action, our “realist,” or “genealogist” 
attributes informing our method of understanding and change. 
 By blurring the lines, the realist is no longer banished to theory; 
the humanist is no longer constrained by the auspices of colonialism. 
There is no longer a realist or a humanist, but only a critical human-
ist: the realist and the humanist working together to re-imagine how 
we understand not only the world at large, but the world at home. 
The critical humanist employs “humanist” tendencies to engage in 
the struggles of humanity while invoking the critic, or “realist,” to con-
stantly challenge his or her assumptions and move from the general 
and abstract to the specific, actual workings of power. 
 In centering law in the actual workings of power, law merges 
openly with the political and social spheres. Focused on the ground 
level, on the realities of specific communities and peoples, legal knowl-
edge and techniques may be freed from the high walls of the legal pro-
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fession. Legal knowledge becomes social knowledge. It is concerned 
with specific, local, immediate issues of specific, local peoples—health 
care, education, welfare—without seeking to attach any grand story or 
ultimate vision of the future. It allows knowledge and reform to move 
outside of law and enjoy a free and open range of discourse and possi-
bility. 
 What I propose is that the realist no longer falls back into the ob-
scurity and moral solitude of legal theory and pessimism—essentially, 
abstraction and inaction—but instead, embraces what is at the root of 
the humanitarian impulse: to take responsibility for our beliefs, to test 
our convictions against the costs we are willing to assume ourselves. It is 
one thing to face up to the colonialism of the past; it is another thing to 
place oneself in the driver’s seat. The history of the tribunals and 
criminal courts are not only a lesson in the limits of our ability to reach 
out; rather, the chief obstacle we face may be that age-old fear of differ-
ence, the first and last defense to any self-critique, to any challenge of 
our own identities, our own reality and sense of right and wrong. For 
Berman, the realist can only function in the morning before the pens 
come out because the realization of the realist’s challenge—that the 
current individual human rights regime is perhaps irreconcilably mired 
in racist and colonial mentality—deals a potentially critical blow to the 
moorings of the international legal order and dislodges it upon the 
open seas towards Africa, Asia, and South America.262 It is the not the 
fear of the “other,” but what the “other” might show us about ourselves 
and our most cherished ideas, that prompts our insecurity about the 
way forward. It exposes that we may rely on pre-written scripts, that the 
words we speak and feelings we share are not our own, but rise out of 
the tribal mysticism and patriarchal irrationality of our past. In Rilke’s 
poem, the Archaic Torso of Apollo, one who views the chiseled torso of the 
deity is transfixed by its message—you must change your life.263 Quite 
simply, our refusal may be that it would disrupt the convenience of our 
daily routines. 
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